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The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century

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ABSTRACT

Obviously, thinking about racial and ethnic identities requires that we first think of identity tout court. Currently, there are numerous theories that refute the definition of identity, and the effort to define identity and race is, ultimately, a political issue whose result has important social consequences (which is obvious when we think of political differences derived from liberal ideology, eg affirmative action versus ideology that ignores the color of the skin).

Keywords:

In a previous work (Layton, 1998), I proposed a model for thinking about gender identity that I thought could explain both the narcissistic wounds caused by a sexist culture and the kind of gender-related experiences that make us feel good as men., women, or any intermediate degree. I called it negotiation model because I wanted to capture the way in which we constantly negotiate gender identity, both from what Benjamin (1988) and others call relationships of subject-object as from mutuality relations. In part, I wrote "against" postmodern theories and lacanian that suggest that identity categories are necessarily coercive and oppressive, that there is no healthy version of gender or racial identity (see, for example, several essays in Appiah Y Gates, 1995; Butler, 1990; George, 2001; Haraway, 1985; several trials in Lane, 1998; Mitchelly Rose, 1985; Riley, 1988).

At the same time, I wanted to give the coercive aspect of identities the recognition it deserves, since all too often psychoanalytic theory ignores the psychic effects of the hierarchies of power in which we live. The negotiation model explains psychologically the defensive and regressive use of identity categories (see Dimen, 2003; Goldner, 1991; May, 1986) as well as the progressive use of the identity categories (for example in the efforts towards liberation and in the resilience manifested by oppressed groups despite the horrible projections to which they are subjected).

What do we mean when we talk about racial or ethnic identities? Are we referring to coherent, socially constructed and inherently oppressive categories, as many theorists claim? Dalal (2002), for example, argues that racism precedes the concept of race and Rustin (1991) states that "'Race' is both an empty category and one of the most destructive and powerful forms of social categorization" (p.57). Cultural critics Lacanians they often argue that coherent identities are oppressive fictions, and Morgan (2002) cites the DNA evidence to affirm that "the term 'race' is an idea constructed without an objective biological basis" (p.567). Or, as those who consider "identity" to be less problematic (eg. Volkan 2004), discuss is it in human nature the need for a large group identity and to form that identity by creating a us-them division?

Or, as the multiculturalists Liberals, are ethnic and racial identities simply based on cultural and / or biological differences not necessarily built on the repudiation of what is different from one, differences that should be celebrated rather than denigrated? Do we understand ethnic and racial differences as sensible (liberal and conservative model) or as interrelated and inter-linked? (post-structuralist model)? More specifically, do we think that identities other than white and Protestant have been constructed in reference to the dominant qualities of being white and Protestant? And, therefore, those in subordinate positions create hierarchical relations among themselves, marked in some way by white domination (Friedman, 1995; Gooding-Williams, 1993; Layton, 1998)?

If we believe the latter, how do we understand such relationships psychologically? In terms of perpetrators and victims? Do we focus, then, politically on rectifying long histories of systematic prejudice and discrimination? Or, as those who do not pay attention to color affirm, racial and ethnic identities rest on cultural and / or biological differences that should be ignored, not taken into account when hiring someone or admitting them to a university? Finally, does it make sense to talk about racial identities without talking simultaneously about how they intersect with class, gender and other identity categories (RM Williams, 1997)? In other words, can we assume that a racial identity is homogeneous, that blacks and whites of any class and gender feel race in the same way?

In order to better understand the regressive and exclusive use of identity categories, I have developed a concept to which I refer as unconscious normative processes (Layton, 2002, 2004^a, 2004b, 2005, 2006). With this term, I refer to the psychological consequences of living in a culture in which norms serve the ideologically dominant purpose of maintaining a status quo of power (1). More specifically, I have investigated the consequences of living within certain hierarchies of class, race, sex and gender. My assumption is that these hierarchies, which confer power and exist for the benefit of those who have the same, not only tend to idealize certain positions of the subject and devalue others, but also tend to do so by dividing human capacities and attributes and granting them assignments of class or race.

These assignments cause narcissistic wounds that organize the desire to belong to one group instead of another. These wounds end up living as identities of class, race, gender and sex. In *Who's that girl? Who's that boy?* (Layton, 1998), for example, I argued that gender inequality creates two distinct subversions of narcissism in men and women. I understand (based on Kohut, 1971, 1977; Kernberg, 1975; and, especially, in Fairbairn 1954 and Guntrip, 1971, which refer to the syndrome as schizoid) that narcissism is a bipolar disorder in which the selfs fragile, wounded by traumatic failures in care, oscillate between self-deprecation and grandiosity, the idealization of the other and denigration, the desires of fusion and the needs of radically distancing the self from the others (Layton, unpublished).

Like Benjamin (1988), Chodorow (1978) and other feminist theorists have written, during a long period of capitalist-patriarchal history, the

dominant norms of middle-class masculinity idealized a form of autonomy that arises from the split of dependence, vulnerability and involvement in relations. This form of autonomy values the domination over the external and internal nature and rejects, thus, the relationship with nature I-you. This assessment produces a dominant ideal that begins with one half of the narcissistic polarities: grandiosity, denigration of the other and avoidance of the intimate connection. This does not mean that the other half is not present in those who live this dominant ideal, but that the ideal is to be omnipotent and not need the other. The dominant norms of femininity, at least before the feminist "revolution", idealized the other narcissistic polarity: self-contempt, the idealization of the other ("you are perfect and I am part of you" [Kohut, 1971, p.. 25]) and wishes to merge " (2).

These coercive norms form the crucible in which we become feminine or masculine, no matter where we place ourselves in the social space (Layton, 1998). These norms are not only norms of gender, but also of race and class. White working-class women and middle-class black women grow up with special rules for their social location, but, as they have made clear Bourdieu (1984) and other social theorists, the social location does not exist without reference to all the others, and all create their own identities adopting some affective and cognitive position towards the dominant cultural ideals. Power hierarchies create and maintain differences that determine what is high and low, good and bad, pure and impure, and there is certainly a general tendency in those who do not have the power for internalize the denigrating attributions that reach them (see Dalal, 2002; Moss, 2003; White, 2002).

However, it would be a mistake to think that the rules internalize without conflict (Layton, 1998, 2004a). Since hierarchies divide and categorize human attributes and capabilities, we find in the clinic and in our lives an incessant conflict between the unconscious processes that seek to maintain those splits and those that reject them. Those who seek to maintain the splits are those that I call unconscious normative processes.

The unconscious normative processes refer to that aspect of the unconscious that pushes to repeat the patterns of affect / behavior / cognition that maintain social norms and that cause psychic distress in the first place. The enactments take place when the therapist is unconsciously pushed by the same norms that push the patient, or when the therapist is moved by destructive norms. Such enactments are more easily unraveled if we are aware of these rules and how they operate. Let's go back to the example of gender, in which we find the cultural mandate to separate the capacities of connection and dependence from the capacities of being subject and independent agent, and to attribute to the first gender female and the second ones the male. This mandate causes the symptoms we are dealing with: for example, it can and has made women feel "unfeminine" and harmful to others when pursuing their own interests, and that men feel "feminine" when they cry or express vulnerability. The alignment of, for example, femininity with dependency can be made conscious (the feminist movement succeeded). When it comes to impacting social hierarchies, however, the unconscious and conflictive comes from the way in which non-egalitarian norms of a culture or subculture constitute psychologically (and executively through constant repetition) dependence and independence. In the culture of the United States, for example, the hierarchies of sex, gender, class and race produce a great variety of social norms and ideologies that require separating dependence from independence and the repudiation / devaluation of the dependence required by the dominant mode of enactment of autonomy. Patients tend not to know that what they suffer for is the way they have separated the two, why It's so hard to feel like a man when you feel

vulnerable, why It is so difficult to simultaneously achieve a feeling of competence and a feeling of connection.

My concept of unconscious normative processes differs from other perspectives on the social unconscious in a relevant way. Dalal (2002) for example, distinguishes the repressed from the hidden evaluations of people and things that we inherited when learning our language and its categories:

In contrast to the repressed... what is so powerful and perhaps insidious about these "evaluations" hidden "that are implicit, is that they slip into the psyche without resistance... These hidden evaluations are nothing more than the social unconscious. [p. 130, italics in the original]

In my opinion, these evaluations do not slip into the psyche without resistance, in fact the family and cultural transmission of racial, as well as class, sex and gender evaluations is often highly conflictive, precisely why These categories are a product of separating human capabilities and needs. Our relational world is at least partly the terrain of all our internalizations conflicting of the antagonisms of class, race, gender and sex that structure society, internalizations that cause neurotic suffering.

Unconscious normative processes, therefore, are one of the psychic forces that strive to consolidate the type of "correct" identity and to obfuscate the workings of unequal power hierarchies. They protect the psychic splits that cultural norms impose and they do so because the risk of debating them leads to loss of love and social approval. But let's not forget that the result of the split is to keep the split close. Compulsions to repetition are the place where the struggle between unconscious coercive normative processes and unconscious processes contrary to the norm is enacted. And since all identities are relational and not individual possessions (in Dalal's words) "Who I am" really boils down to "where I belong" [2002, p. 187]), these repetitions are awakened and recreated in relationships.

In the clinic, then, we are likely to find the patient and analyst continually engaging in enacting unconscious normative processes. The concept of unconscious normative processes usefully demonstrates the inextricable link between the psychic and the social: the regimes of power that define the relations between genders, between races and classes, and between those with different sexual desires condition the way we live dependency and independence, separation and individuation, affects such as shame and a large number of other psychoanalytic basic components that are not usually thought in social terms.

Race and ethnic identity: psychoanalytic perspectives

The psychoanalytic perspectives of race differ depending on how a school (or a theorist) formulates its theory of aggression and what constitutes the self-other relationship (3). Dalal (2001) conducted a study of the psychoanalytic clinical literature on race and discovered that, in all cases, differences between races were assumed to be essential rather than historically constituted. None of the authors of his study wondered, he points out, how "whites" become white. He found that there were two types of assumptions in psychoanalytic literature: that, deep down, we are all equal and culture is only a coating; or that, deep down, we are all unique, and the social pollutes or floods our uniqueness. In any case, culture is considered something external to internal psychic functions.

It's more, Dalal He found that the reality of cultural racism had never been taken into account as a cause of problems in the clinical psychoanalytic encounter. It is often assumed that the patient is acting childish fantasies; in the best of cases, race intermingles with these fantasies, but it is never determinant. Racism is conceptualized as an effect of individual prejudice, never as a cause of it. Dalal (2001) establishes the hypothesis that external reality is left out of psychoanalytic explanations of racial prejudice because of the fault of the white man.

More recent clinical discussions of race take external racism into account, and these often lead inexorably to discussions about the effects of trauma, especially traumas that are not verbalized but pass from one generation to the next (Apprey, 1993; George, 2001; Layton, 2002; Volkan, 2004; Walls, 2006) (4). The hatred involved in racist policies and racist projections tends to lead to all the well-known consequences of trauma: intense shame and hatred towards oneself, splitting, dissociation, suicidal or homicidal desires, to name a few (Walls, 2006; White, 2002). Herman (1992) writes that the psychic consequences of trauma often result in a tripartite internal structure that includes the positions of victim, perpetrator of damage and rescuer. As the clinical vignette that I will present suggests, it is always important to keep these three positions in mind when we work - as well as how the three awaken in us.

Clinicians influenced by post-structuralist anti-racism walk by the fine line that separates skepticism towards the category of "race" and respect for the fact that the "fiction" of racial difference is, nevertheless, a traumatic reality and live, because of the forces of racism and the many possible responses to those forces. Leary (1995, 1997) and Altman (2000) have argued convincingly that, whether or not it is talked about, race is always in the office when the dyad is interracial, and that the analyst who does not bring it up risks avoiding difficult but probably present material. The trauma of racism affects both "victims" and "perpetrators". It affects each of them differently, but as the clinical example of Altman, the victim and the author are psychically connected and the two roles can easily be reversed.

According to my own clinical experience, I have sometimes found it useful to mention race, or at least the privilege of race, even when patient and analyst were both white (Layton, 2006). On the other hand, Dalal (2002) states (with reference to the extensive data on the historicity of deracialization processes) that racism historically preceded the concept of race and, in their opinion, any reference to the race supposes a spurious base for the differentiation between races (see also Kovel, 1988) (5). If we take this for granted, then bringing the race to therapy is as complicated as pretending it is not there, because what is exactly the racial difference? While physical distinctions may anchor our notions of racial difference, what is really, in its oppressive mode, has to do with the power to divide human abilities and call white and other not white. It has to do with an ideological way of maintaining power differentials, or assigning, as I would say Bourdieu (1984) the distinction to a group of people and the lack of distinction - or, in the best of cases, a second class - to others.

As pointed Dalal (2002) citing Elias (1991), words and categories are incorporated emotions, and the positive or negative valence of words and categories derives from power relations: "Emotions are evoked and used to fulfill functions of differentiation.... Emotions are a technique that is exploited in the task of differentiation, and are not 'cause' of differentiation as sometimes wrongly assumed" (Dalal, 2002, p.131, italics in the original). When we observe more closely the content of the racial split (as I will do in the vignette discussed later in this paper), we will find all kinds of effects of these processes of splitting: among other cognitive effects, effects on the way in which they define and value attachment and the capacity to be an agent subject, and effects on emotional states, in their expression and their scope.

On the other hand, going back to the identity negotiation model, racial difference also has to do with everything that people labeled as the racially other. Collectively and individually have been created historically from that labeling. In what I differ from many deterministic stances on identity, it is in the feeling that racial identities and

identity between dominant and subordinate identities are not closed systems; the identities of the subordinate groups are not fully determined by the power of the dominant groups. As stated by Hall (1982), and Laclau Y Mouffe (1985), elaborating the concept of hegemony of Gramsci (1971), the political and social life of modernity implies an incessant struggle between dominant and subordinated groups by power to precisely define constructs such as race.

Therefore, there are aspects of the identities that non-white groups create for themselves that are healthy, sometimes more psychologically healthy than the psychic states of those who identify with the split cultural ideals ascribed to the white race. Leary (1995, 1997) and Altman (2000) argue convincingly that, because of racism and the vital differences involved, whites and blacks in the culture of the United States observe the same phenomena in very different ways, another argument for the need to address racial difference in the analytical framework. The race theory of Dalal, which implies that drawing attention to the race is already racist, suggests that we can not avoid racist actions in the clinic, no matter what we do: we put into action racial processes when we bring a racial difference to the office, as well as when we deny the importance of said differences.

In the vignette that follows, I explore this problem through a series of enactments with an Asian-American patient, with whom the unconscious normative processes pushed me comfortably into a position of whiteness. After examining the clinical importance of the ambivalence of stereotypes, I will discuss the growing discomfort with this patient felt as I explored what he saw as his tendency to self-abnegation. And finally, I will observe the patient's effort to know what love is, an effort that showed how the love - at like many constructs in which analysts rarely think in cultural terms - is impregnated by race. The interactions that I have selected also reveal the way in which race intersects with gender, class and sexuality.

Clinical vignette

Michael was an Asian-American gay man in his mid-thirties who went to therapy because he could not get his ex-boyfriend, a white middle-class man, out of his mind. The patient was concerned that this would interfere with their new relationship and hoped that the therapy, which he had never done before, could help him to remove the disturbing thoughts about the ex-boyfriend, especially the compulsion to compare himself to him in an unfavorable way for himself and to feel socially inept in relation to him. Michael had felt socially unfit for a long time, and at least part of the origin of this feeling was that his mother, who valued family and education very much, did not let him have too much social life outside of the family. He was expected to focus solely on the work of the school.

His mother and father had migrated from Asia to a suburb of a big city when they were in their early twenties, and Michael considered that many of his thoughts and feelings were a product of his non-Western culture - and he valued them as such. However, he felt, that he had problems with self-esteem and hoped that therapy would help him with that. At the same time, I had clear conflicts from the beginning about being in therapy. It seems that one of the ways in which his parents had differentiated from "Westerners" was to feel superior about their ability to be reserved people; parents thought that Westerners spoke too loudly, too publicly and too extensively about their private affairs. They also did it with their emotions. Michael often thought that way, too.

The experience lived by Michael illustrates the split and, in this case, the racialization and the nationalization of human capacities: in the family, emotion and rationality were separated and considered to be Western Y not western, respectively. This, surely, is not the way in which dominant Western groups tend to divide capacities, but if parents saw as their strong point that they could be rational and

scientific, that served to distinguish them from others in terms of rationality. higher. However, these things are much more complex than they appear at first glance. It turned out that Michael's mother could sometimes become highly "irrational" - screaming, shouting and imposing rules that for Michael did not make sense. Ironically, this only increased Michael's identification with rationality and against emotion (6).

In high school, Michael realized his desire to be part of the privileged white group, but he also joined his Asian friends to denigrate the practices of the most popular kids - for example mocking that white people seemed to change continually as a couple but only between people of the same racial group. Michael imagined that he was the only one of the Asian boys who wanted to be part of the white group; As he told me, it would not be logical for Asian boys to denigrate something they really wanted to join. (Here I gently pointed out that this was precisely what he was doing, and maybe the logic is not always as good as it is supposed to be). Because of his wishes, Michael must have felt a certain degree of alienation from his friends as well, which accentuated his feeling of social ineptitude. The striking thing about his ambivalent place between Asians and Caucasians, East and West, was that it made him feel quite insecure - about what he felt and about the value of what he felt, because it pushed him to denigrate the things he wanted.

From my first sessions with Michael, I saw that two networks were beginning to form, one that associated certain attributes with the Western whites and others with superior Asians, and another that denigrated Asians and idealized Western whites. These stereotypes were not just racial and ethnic; they were points nodes that united race, ethnic identity, gender and sexuality. Michael and I were aware of these networks, and, at one point, he laughed and said "I rely heavily on stereotypes, right? "

I bring Michael's story because his way of separating and racialize The attributes, sometimes with a superior position of the white, sometimes inferior, aroused many thoughts and feelings about how to work better with it. It also made me aware of my ways of categorizing and judging and made me be cautious towards certain certainties with which I realized that it operated. The therapy raised many questions about how intersectional identity categories are lived and how differentials of power create differences: differences in the range and expression of emotions, in the relationship between emotion and cognition, in the modes of separation and attachment, in the same experience of love that one has. I do not consider Michael to be representative of Asian Americans in general (7); rather, I rely on our work together to explore more deeply how ideologies about race, ethnic identity, gender and sexuality intersect and how they are lived and put into action in treatment.

As I have already mentioned, Michael idealized and denigrated the Caucasians, which placed me in a position now superior, now inferior. Although he was aware of his tendency to stereotype, for Michael the split on which this trend was based was unconscious, and the trauma that caused the split in the first place. Excision and projection can be universal defense mechanisms, but racism creates the wounds that organize these defenses, and it is in a racist field where people put into action repetitions that keep wounds open and simultaneously seek to cure them (Dalal, 2002 ; Layton, 2002).

Michael's ex-boyfriend (who was in fact a midlevel employee in a company and not a top executive, as the patient's admiration for him would have implied) embodied in Michael's fantasy everything he was not: he was handsome, smart, dressed well, athletic, successful in the company and, most importantly, socially sophisticated and popular. Michael's attraction was clearly a mixture of sexual desire and the desire to

have what he thought his ex-boyfriend had. To be the right type of male in Michael's economy, one had to be white. The ideal of whiteness that organized her desire was high class, mundane, popular and - as the ex-boyfriend did not feel totally comfortable identifying himself as gay - at least he was heterosexual Y homophobic.

Michael denigrated what he considered Asian masculinity, and he did not think he could be attracted to an Asian male. He felt that neither the white men, the only ones who were worthy, nor the Asians, were attracted to Asian men. At the same time, he and his Asian friends had despised what they thought was the interested and falsely sincere culture of his ex-boyfriend. As he pointed out Bourdieu (1984) One of the central mechanisms of the aspect of identity formation based on the repudiation of the different, is to affirm the virtue of any social group in which one finds oneself (hence the title of the book by Bourdieu, *Distinction*).

Michael's Asian friends played the role of asking "Anyway, who wants to be white?" The whites are selfish. Actually, the ex and the patient's friends seemed preoccupied with others, he said Michael, but in reality, they were always manipulating social scenes to get what they wanted. Michael even complained that his affectionate current boyfriend had that Western way of thinking first of himself. For example, in restaurants, Michael observed, his white friends used to drink water or tea when they wanted, while he and other Asians he knew always served others first, and lastly themselves. So here was another stereotype: that white Westerners were self-centered and Asians were more educated and considerate of others.

The ambivalence of the stereotype

While the content of Michael's beliefs and observations is important and tells us how he and his family divided his and his family's human abilities, I want to first establish the form that the stereotype took: the oscillating idealization and denigration. Michael's conflicts and the way in which stereotypes worked for him as pseudosolutions resonate with recent theorizations about the ambivalence of the stereotype, and even amplify them.

Writing within a Lacanian framework about colonial discourse, Bhabha (1994) argues that stereotypes function as fetishes: they try to fix a significant to a concrete meaning (eg, blacks are animals, Jews are seized, etc.) and therefore they deny the fact that signifiers are always open to multiple meanings and that identities can never be fixed. Subjectivity disturbs incessantly the categories of identity because, by nature, it is divided by the existence of the unconscious and the non-symbolizable. (That division between meaning and being is what Lacan [1998] refers to as castration). The fetish-stereotype operates in the narcissistic economy of the imaginary Lacanian, the record in which the I is born as such.

In this Lacanian economy, the child about 18 months of age sees an image of himself that appears as a coherent whole. However, the child feels the self as a fragmentary and chaotic mess. The child identifies with this coherent version of the self, the ideal self. For Lacan, then, the self is based on the lack of recognition that we are not castrated. We know we are We are castrated beings, and yet we deny it by trying to focus on perfect identities. If we can do it, we use everything available to us - scientific knowledge, gender mastery, consumer goods - to deny the fact that subjectivity is essentially divided, that the self is not under control. Everything that reminds us of our fragmentary nature awakens aggression, narcissistic rage.

The stereotypes arise from the mind of the colonizer who, by psychic reassurance, interprets the same in the other, knowing all the time that the other is different, and tries to eradicate the other in the self. To maintain the denial, the colonizer must not give the other the opportunity to speak. Because when the other speaks, the fixity of meaning that the colonizer seeks to impose (in, for example, the colonialist ideologies of how black people are) is revealed as fictitious. The oscillation between knowing and

not knowing is thus central to the colonial discourse, which fantasizes the other as knowable and equal, and yet aware that the other is different and represents a challenge to attempts to fix it within the stereotyped coordinates of the dominant discourse. The difference of the other, and the recognition of differences within the self, are threats to the colonizer's fantasy of totality and equality.

Bhabha (1994) exemplifies the way colonizer and colonized are involved in colonial discourse through a well-known "scene" of *Black Skin, White Masks* (Fanon, 1967, pp. 109-114). In this explanation, made in the first person, in a train a child sees Fanon and tells his mother "Mira, un negro", (p.109). Fun at first, Fanon is going feeling increasingly annoyed as he feels his humanity and its multiplicity as a man evaporates is reduced to just a "black body" (what he called an epidermal scheme racialized). He trembles with cold. The child, unaware of his aggression, interprets the tremor as a tremor of anger, and, suddenly, it scares the black man, fearing that the "black" will eat it. For Bhabha (following Lacan), the unstable terrain on which the bourgeois ego is formed ensures that the attempt to deny or dominate the difference will unleash a continuous aggression against the self and the other.

Writing in a Kleinian framework on the relationship between African-Americans and whites, Balbus (2004) argues that the dominant version of whiteness in the United States requires whites to separate emotion from reason, the body of mind, nature of culture. The black becomes the container of what has been separated from the white. Balbus argues that white stereotypes about blacks they offer important proof that whites love and hate blacks, and that they have a huge guilt for what historically has been done to blacks in this country. Guilt, however, is not expressed through reparation; In contrast, structural racism causes depressive distress at any stage of development-oral, anal or genital-that manifests itself in the regressive split and characteristic projection of the paranoid-paranoid form of relating. The stereotypes that whites develop about blacks at each evolutionary level reflect the split between unintegrated love and hate.

Balbus (2004) catalogs some of the contradictory assessments of white stereotypes about blacks, including white perceptions that blacks are "lazy and lazy" but also "relaxed and serene"; they are denigrated as "animals", while at the same time they are idealized as "natural athletes". Balbus maintains that the reparations, the monetary ones, would be symbolic of an emotional reparation in which, instead of continuing to divide, the whites would recognize the damage they have done to the blacks and handle the anxiety and guilt that this knowledge causes them. His argument is that to resume the white projections it is crucial for the welfare not only of blacks, but also of whites themselves.

In essence, I come to the same conclusion as these authors, that the nature of the stereotype is ambivalent, but I come to it from a different psychoanalytic framework, since I place ambivalence as derived not from an original destructive instinct, nor from an original split in our feelings about the breast / parental figure, nor of an original refusal to recognize limits and loss. Instead, I derive it from racism: from the fact that the dominant identity categories are defined by dividing into binary pairs the human capacities and attributes that can only develop and prosper in tandem, such as dependence and independence, connection and capacity, emotion and reason.. This division determines the ways in which we love, hate, create. And the reason why these divisions exist has little to do with human nature. Rather, there are in so that those who have power, the power to define the proper identity, remain in power.

The oscillation between the denigration and the idealization that marks the elaboration of stereotypes by my patient Michael is characteristic of narcissism, and is part of my argument that racism and other cultural inequalities produce not only narcissistic harm, but also character and defenses. Michael often found himself caught in his network of projections, sometimes disdaining what he actually wanted, sometimes disdaining what he felt he was. Is the fantasy behind the process of creating stereotypes a fantasy of "lost" totality that nobody can and could not achieve (Bhabha, 1994)? Is the love-hate relationship with the white, rooted in original destructive and libidinal drives, split in half for cause of racism (Balbus, 2004)?

I suggest that fantasies of lost wholeness and division and projection driven by racism arise from the ashes of a narcissistic wound of racist motivation, which leads us to look for a place, a space of fantasy, in which we stop being vulnerable to pain, humiliation and isolation. Michael's ex-boyfriend, who embodied the values of white and whose rejection of Michael only made him more desirable, represented for Michael that space of fantasy. In this fantasy space, which Michael was reluctant to abandon with all his might, he would be loved by the ex or he would become more like the ex-and he would never again feel the pain of inferiority.

For Bhabha (1994) and others (eg George, 2001), the ideal colonial ego is white, and anything that threatens the assertion of being white can arouse anxiety and aggression. An important risk of discourses that reinforce racial difference is to define who can claim the quality of target / totality and who can not. In their article on racial melancholy, Eng and Han (2002) argue that the stereotypes that persecute Asian Americans are different from those that persecute African-Americans. These authors focus specifically on the psychic effects of model-minority stereotype. In his view, many middle-class Asians or upward social mobility become melancholy because success in white America often requires a rejection of part of who they are. Moreover, Eng and Han claim that, while Asian Americans can get rich and succeed in their field, they can never become white; If the inclusion that accompanies the white being is what they covet, the psychic mission is doomed to failure.

My patient Michael felt that he had inadequate attributes, including body type, to be the right kind of man. The love that Michael felt for his ex-boyfriend reminded me of the psychic positions Benjamin identified in *The Loops of Love* (1988), which I referred to earlier as versions of narcissism. For, in that relationship, Michael had adopted the submissive, self-denigrating position, typical of dominant white femininity, in its relation to dominant white masculinity. Of again, his desire seemed to echo the formula Kohutian "You are perfect and I am part of you" (Kohut, 1971).

All this seemed obvious to me and I thought that, in the course of therapy, Michael would probably come to see that he did not love his ex-boyfriend as much as what he represented and what he lacked. What was not so obvious to me later was that in many exchanges about their desire, Michael had given me - and I had unconsciously assumed the position of the target. Although it is true that in our concrete historical moment, I am considered and consider myself white (as opposed to historical moments) in which Jews were considered non-white), and while it is true that I have many of the privileges of being white, it is also true, as Lacan (1977, 1978) could have said, that whiteness entails a fantasy of totality that nobody You can claim.

The pretense to embody the white is precisely the kind of unconscious normative process that sustains racial inequality. What might be considered my unconscious desire to occupy the position of what I would call invulnerability (instead of totality) - a collusion with Michael's desire - demonstrates that racism and class inequality not only divide the psyche of the subordinate; they also reinforce the dominant's fantasmatic stance, and both parties want to cling to the fantasy that-again, as Lacan would say-

someone owns the phallus (see Bhabha's discussion, 1994, above) and is invulnerable to pain and loss.

I think it is important to think how, technically, we can handle the split inherent in racial categories without fostering a fantasy of totality. While one afternoon I was listening to a Leary conference (2003) I suddenly realized that I had adopted that day vis to vis with my patient the position of the white. Michael and I had been talking about the psychic function for which his ex-boyfriend had served, the connection with the white that that relationship had given him, and I remembered that I said something like "And you can never be white". Thinking article Eng and Han (2002), I remember having said to me something like: "Poor guy. He will never be white and he will have to mourn for it. "

Once I realized my collusion with the norm that separates the white from the non-white, however, I began to ask other kinds of questions: for example, what was the white thing for him, what did he think was desirable? attributes that I associated with it, and how had those attributes fallen into the category of not-self? More importantly, I asked Michael if he was assuming I was white and what that meant to him. Although recognizing the privilege that I have for the fact that I am associated with the white, I tried, however, to transmute the categories of white and Asian into what they mean in a racialized culture and in their racialized imagination. Consequently, at the same time that the white as a narcissistic structure was denigrated or idealized, there arose a third space of the white in which Michael used the fantasy that his ex-boyfriend and I "clung to the white" in order to explore what that he had coveted and what had been isolated in life.

On good education and self-absorption, emotion and reason

Now I will look at the content of the stereotypes and how that content was interpreted in the treatment. On numerous occasions, Michael's therapy not only confronted me with my own stereotypes but also made some of the health assumptions that I had sustained conscious and problematic, assumptions that were also unconsciously enacted in the treatment and that served to sustain a status quo of determined power.

As I mentioned before, it seemed to me that the Western / non-Western Michael construct sometimes took the form of what was familiar to me as male / female binary. One day, she told me that her ex-boyfriend had pointed out that when Michael walked down the street and someone was coming towards him in the opposite direction, it was always Michael who moved and stepped aside. Michael also wondered sometimes why he did not feel angry on the occasions when he knew that his Western friends would have been angry. I often noticed that Westerners seemed very angry-for example, they said they were having a bad day, instead of just that some thing had not gone well. In other words, I felt that Westerners had an irrational way of seeing non-personal events - such as bad weather - as something personal.

More than once, I found myself thinking that, if Michael had been a white woman and had told me some of the things he had done, I would have been sure that we were facing problems of self-assertion. But what made me less certain, in this case and perhaps in all of them, is that I happened to have read an article by Rothblum et al. (2000) that drew my attention to the possibility of some tension in therapy, of Michael's continued discomfort for being in therapy, could have something to do with my conscious and unconscious assumptions and how he was putting them into action.

Rothblum et al. they argued that the basic principles of the theory of Attachment-for example, that secure attachment favors the freedom to explore-is not universal, but

is the product of Western psychological assumptions. Comparing Western and Japanese child-rearing practices, they point out that, while Western parental figures encourage their children to reaffirm, understand what they need and ask for, Japanese parent figures tend to anticipate the child's needs and fears. to create an environment in which needs are met without the child having to ask for it. The Japanese mother, they argue, favors emotional proximity, while the western mother favors exploration and autonomy. While the western ideal of competence values to achieve for oneself what is needed versus relying on others to satisfy one's own needs, in Japanese parenting practices, the focus is the coordination of one's needs with those of others. In the West, babies are encouraged to explore and orientate towards the environment; In Japan, babies explore less and are encouraged to focus more on their mothers, to be more dependent. While in the West it is valued to link attachment and exploration, in Japan the main link is between attachment and dependence. This serves the Japanese value of accommodation or "social adaptation". "These terms," the authors write, "refer to the empathy of children with others, their conformity to the wishes of others and their sensitivity to social norms and codes" (Rothblum et al., 2000, p. 1099).

For Michael, many things made therapy difficult, and the least of them was not the idea that he was supposed to start the sessions. I tell myself that I felt "overwhelming" to speak only of himself; that made him feel like he was bothering me. I interpreted this as a problem of self-assertion, but maybe that was not all! And yet it was obvious that Michael, as someone caught between two cultures, struggled, as Eng and Han (2002) suggest, between being like a Westerner and being like his family.

Must I be, therefore, the cultural agent that makes Michael feel more comfortable operating with Western norms, effectively addressing one side of the conflict? Or is my job simply to point out the different rules, conflicts, and let Michael find his own way? Consciously, I believe that my work is the latter, but I fear that very often I carry out the first, based on the health ideals that my Western education has defended, ideals incorporated not only in the technique but also in the treatment framework. I suppose one could say that this performance is conscious since, after all, I can articulate what the ideals are. But my opinion is that, even though the ideals may be conscious, the split and the devaluation on which they are based are not. Repeatedly fulfilling the norms of my profession, I maintain the approval / love of my peers while defending a certain distribution of power.

Then one day, Michael presents a dilemma he has with a current boyfriend. Michael does not really know if he loves him or not; He knows he is loved, but it is not enough. I ask him what his feelings are. She says she knows that she loves her parents because she wants them to be happy, and she wants to do everything she can to make them happy. Is that a feeling? He asks. I propose the hypothesis that there is something that prevents you from feeling and knowing what you feel, and I think it has to do with the way in which feelings have been identified as Western Y bad. Repeated his feeling that Westerners react disproportionately when bad things happen, and is happy that to him this does not happen. But sometimes he would like to get angry-and he's not sure he should. In fact, he feels angry sometimes; and then he mentions a new game that he is playing with himself, in which he waits a little longer before taking off when someone walks towards him on the street. He assumes that as his ex-boyfriend pointed out to him the fact that he always departs first, now he thinks there must be something wrong with this behavior. But he is angry that the others do not move away - it is not fair and it is impolite. He is happy to be as is' But is being trodden?

I struggled in this treatment because my hypothesis, based on certain things that Michael said showed a desire to express more emotion, was that the whole Western / non-Western theme was a way in which he remained inhibited, preventing integrating

emotion and reason. He also felt that his mother's shouting fits, sometimes accompanied by humiliating behavior, made the emotion frightening. And yet, I certainly agreed with him that Western forms of affirmation (or, at least, his version of the East Coast of the United States) often crossed the border with rudeness and lack of politeness.

At one point, I talked to Michael about my confusions. He was talking about how he had enjoyed the previous weekend with the visit of a friend, a man who laughed a lot with Michael's jokes. He pointed out that he generally felt responsible for his guests having a good time, without noticing he was having a good time. Since I read this again as an abnegation on his part, I brought up the confusions I had felt about the Western / non-Western dichotomy. I told her I was worried that, like the ex-boyfriend, I might have been pathologizing something about these values of courtesy and duty that guided his behavior, and I told him that my therapy culture tends to understand some of these ways of being as self-abnegation.

I mentioned that I was sure that, if I were treating a Western woman, I would have moved in the direction of seeing that behavior as self-sacrificing. I told him "I suppose what matters is if you consider those forms of being an obstacle for you; ¿ Vd. Do you want things to be different? "

Michael then did a review of some of the examples that he considered of the western rudeness, and in the new interpretation, things were more complicated, more East-West: he said that, when the tea is served, he realizes that if not There is a lot left in the teapot, you can run out of tea; this, in fact, bothers him. In fact, he said the responsibility of making others happy is also directed to self: If your friend does not have liked what to him seemed fun, he would have felt devalued and guilty.

Then she pointed out that her boyfriend used to leave him frequently only at parties, and how the boyfriend rationalized his behavior affirming the value of independence and the contempt for being stuck. But, Michael said, "I told him more than once that I did not feel comfortable in those situations, and he should not have left me alone."

"Actually," I answered, and at that moment I realized that this was not about whether the value system was correct; but about being in tune with your partner, aware of their vulnerabilities.

At this point, I decided to ask Michael if I might have any feelings about my next vacation, since he had mentioned being left alone. The rest of the session focused on the question of whether or not he really needed therapy: he associated with the first therapist he consulted, the one who referred him to me a year earlier, and expressed the feeling that his office was much better placed than mine, and that he would like to be able to sleep while I was away and think, in my absence, if I should leave therapy.

He then associated with the fact that his friend's girlfriend was not very attractive, even though the friend was. And when I asked her if this could have something to do with what she had brought before, she concluded the sequence saying that her new boyfriend did not think he really needed therapy. "I think the things that happen to me happen to a lot of people - and I do not think the others are in therapy for those things." I thought that this expression of discomfort with the therapy was related to everything that had arisen before about what was Western and what was not. I told Michael, defensively and not defensively, that many are in therapy precisely because of the issues he has raised. And then he told me that he would not pay me my fees if his insurance did not pay him, and he felt guilty about it; just to know that your insurance coverage expires within two months.

This material is so full of suggestive moments that I almost hesitate to offer an interpretation. But my best guess is that Michael may have felt hurt when I suggested a connection between his psychology and that of Western femininity. Had he inadvertently feminized this Asian man who was already sensitive to the female stereotype - as gay and as Asian? Maybe he wanted to point out to me that he really is much more assertive and self-referential, more masculine, than I think. Maybe the next association, about abandonment, would not have as much to do with my impending vacation as with the way I had hurt it. Like her ex-boyfriend, such Once he should have known that what he was saying made him feel uncomfortable.

I venture this conjecture because the material that came later, about whether or not it should leave the therapy and if it was worth paying for it, had a hostile face. I did not overlook the fact that the therapist I had come to first was not only closer to her home, but also quite young and beautiful - was he perhaps trying to hurt me by questioning my femininity?

At the same time, Michael's conflict over therapy also had other roots. An important issue with her current boyfriend was that he did not seem to value the process, and Michael increasingly came to see how he valued it himself. I think he found his desire to insight as a taboo, and perhaps even associated with femininity degraded and the degraded West.

What is love?

I conclude my discussion of this vignette with another topic that Michael faced during therapy: the question of what love is. This was not only a problem of the present, but I also invoke it here to demonstrate how the constructs we tend to regard as more universal and psychological, less culturally influenced, are, in many ways, physical Y socially constructed.

Above I noted that Michael was not sure if he was in love with his current partner and also that he felt he was not very desirable - a feeling heightened by his ex-boyfriend, but that the current boyfriend totally contradicted. The current boyfriend had only had two other couples in his life, and both were Asian. My patient wondered about white men who only want Asians - he said that, generally, only fat and old white men go with Asians. And Michael wondered why he was never attracted to Asian men.

Countless works of fiction convince me that love is a social construct as much as a feeling, and that racism can destroy or seriously interfere with the capacity to love. No work, perhaps, deepens in the socially constructed nature of love better than M. Butterfly (Hwang, 1989). In this work, a white French diplomat, Gallimard, passionately falls in love with a person whom he thinks is a diminutive, feminine Asian opera singer, to which he has listened to sing the leading role in Madame Butterfly. She tells him the tragic story of the American sailor who seduced and then abandoned the Japanese Butterfly, who, in desperation, committed suicide. And, then, he mocks Gallimard for finding the beautiful story. In a powerful speech, it highlights the way power relations infuse love:

It's one of your favorite fantasies, right? The submissive oriental woman and the cruel white man... Consider it this way: what would you say if the blond queen of the former students fell in love with a Japanese businessman and low? He treats her cruelly, then goes home for three years, during which she prays before her photo and rejects marriage to a young Kennedy. Then when he knows that he has married, he kills himself. Now, I think you would think that this girl is a deranged idiot, right? But as an Oriental who commits suicide for a Westerner - ah ! - it seems beautiful. [Hwang, 1989, p. 17]

And yet, this is exactly what the work represents, the revenge of the Asian man, low, thin, against the white western. Having fallen madly in love with his Butterfly, Gallimard learns that the object of his love is actually a transvestite

Asian male. Desperate to preserve the fantasy of his authentic heterosexual love, where men are dominant and submissive women, Gallimard transforms into the female Asian Butterfly, and is killed for love.

And perhaps there is no author who shows better the rate of damage that racism inflicts on love than Toni Morrison. In one of his short stories, "Recitatif" (1983), two girls, one black and one white, are abandoned in an orphanage because their mothers can not take care of them. A mother is physically ill; the other is mentally. We do not know which of the girls is black and which is white, and Morrison, mixing class and race signifiers, makes his readers face up to our own racial stereotypes as we frantically try to imagine who is black and who is white. But history takes us through the lives of girls and shows us how, at any historical moment, racism frustrates their ability to rediscover the mutual care and protection they once shared when, upon seeing each other for the first time, each one recognized in the other the vulnerability caused by maternal abandonment.

Such literary works suggest the reasons why Michael could only love white men, especially to those who could not or did not want to be sexual with him. As the therapy progressed, his membership in a gay Asian activist organization seemed to decrease his homophobia, and he began to be attracted to men from certain Asian subcultures other than his own. It seemed to me that here was an example of how essentialist categories and identity politics can, in fact, facilitate growth and defeat internalized racist and sexist prejudices.

But in this case there is more to history than love and ethnicity. For Michael, love was less a feeling than a sense of duty. He came to understand that the passion he felt for his ex-boyfriend had to do with him remaining inaccessible and rejecting. Michael's unique experiences of passion were within that model of unrequited love. (My interpretation was that her desire was fueled by her desire to have what the ex-boyfriend fantasized to have). Moreover, the love just knew I loved her parents because she wanted them to be happy, because they had sacrificed for him. He wanted to sacrifice for them in turn, and to . . . That was what he called love. At the beginning of her therapy, she told that she only cried in the movies during the scenes of love between parents and children, never in the love scenes between adults. In his opinion, love between adults was never pure, because, simply by wanting the other, "he is asking for something to be returned from his love".

During the treatment, I was never sure if Michael simply did not love his current boyfriend, and he was simply enjoying how much this man loved him, or if we were facing an inability to love that had to do with several other factors: inhibition of feeling and behaving "irrationally"; self-denigration and internalized homophobia ("I do not want to be a member of any club that accepts me as a member"); and the confusion that always seemed to occur when the other knew what he wanted from him. Actually, it seemed to me that the legacy of the insistent presence of Michael's mother - which he perceived as love, but also as control - made him feel insecure about what he felt whenever the other was . . . safe. I thought that the restrictions on his freedom that had so displeased him during growth had been rationalized as a kind of "true" love, a disinterested love.

And then I came across an article about filial devotion in Chinese culture (Gu, 2006). The author of this article argued that the Oedipus in this culture is different from the western Oedipus. Specifically, it is characterized by a loyalty between the parental figures and the son that transcends the loyalty between spouses. Again, I saw offset by the recognition that the desire of my patient was not just defensive, and was defensive perhaps only when viewed from my particular frame. Am I so

discouraged that disinterested love seems absurd to me? I certainly did not hear this interpretation of love of his mother as disinterested; it seemed to me that her sacrifices were aimed so much to get her son to reach where she and her husband could not reach, as they were to make their son happy. But I suppose I should ask: what does happiness have to do with? Is the idea that we are supposed to be happy is another Western value?

I leave the reader with my confusion instead of with no attempt at an answer.

Conclusion

This summary of my work with Michael gives some idea of how racist hierarchies create racial identities that are characterized by the oscillating dynamics of idealization and devaluation characteristic of narcissism. The norms of race, class, gender and sexuality, norms transmitted within family and cultural enclaves of love and hate (P. Williams, 1997), are unconsciously and subsequently legitimized in the way we affirm ourselves in the world and in the way we connect with others. As Altman (2000) has stated, clinicians have to assume that their racism floods the clinical encounter in a certain way; I hope to have here we show some of the ways in which patient and therapist enact the norms that divide and racialize emotion and reason, dependence and independence, love and hatred.

NOTES

The way in which I formulate the connection between hierarchies of power and lived experience (Layton, 1998, 2002) derives from the way in which one the relational psychoanalytic feminist theory and social theory -as they have been described, for example, Altman (1995), Benjamin (1988), Chodorow Goldner, (1991), Harris (1991), Leary (1995, 1997), Lesser, 1997), Schwartz (1992, 1995) - with post-structuralist theories, especially with work of Butler (1995) and Bourdieu (1984) on the "distinction" and class. My theory of unconscious normative processes also owes a debt to the culturalist psychoanalytic tradition of Fromm (1941), with Kohut's theories of narcissism (1971, 1977) and with Fairbairn's theories about schizoid personality, as well as Klein's theories about schizoid mechanisms. Some few clinicians in Great Britain, mainly from the group of the psychoanalytic tradition, have also elaborated ideas about a social unconscious in relation to clinical practice; I refer the reader especially to Hopper (2003) and Dalal (2002), as well as to one of the main sources of Dalal, Foulkes (1990). (1978), Dimen (2003),

Currently, the dominant norms of femininity are fluctuating and, in fact, a newly articulated middle class ideal seems increasingly the dominant male norm of defensive autonomy (Layton, 1004c, 2004d)

For an excellent summary of psychoanalytic theories of race, see Dalal, 2002, chapter 2.

George (2001) argues that African-Americans can cling defensively to racial identity to avoid confronting the unsymbolized trauma of slavery. According to the scheme Lacanian of George, racial identities work with too often caused the lagoon suturing in subjectivity by the trauma of slavery. The trauma not symbolized in the Real gives rise to repetition. While racial identity can be used to encourage progressive politics when it is recognized as socially constructed and provisional, it is too often used defensively to mourn the trauma.

Dalal (2002) writes that "the terms race, ethnic identity and culture are all names for differences" (p 23, italics in the original) In his opinion, the function of differentiation, normally hidden, is naturalize power relations. He urges us to observe not the difference but its function, and why a certain difference is "heated" at specific times.

Note that I refer to "rationality", not reason. I do it because I want to emphasize that split polarities tend to be monstrous versions of what they claim to be. As Freud (1915) once said about repression, the content of the repressed does not remain the same as it was when it was repressed. Moreover, "proliferates in the dark... and takes extreme forms of expression" (page 149). This is true also for what is split and dissociated, so when we say that emotion and reason are split, I want to make clear that the result of the split will always be pathological versions of what I consider the usual human capacities of emotion and reason.

I realize perfectly well that the Japanese of America, for example, do not have the same background as the Chinese or the American Indians, although, to preserve confidentiality, I hide these differences at certain moments of the article.

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